Development at gunpoint: Why Rwanda’s flawed model should not be replicated elsewhere in Africa
This post is part of a collaboration with the Global Development Initiative.
The Singapore of Africa—that is the analogy some analysts have used to describe Rwanda’s development model over the past decades, and it may be appropriate. Just as Singapore was able to transform itself from an underdeveloped city-state into an advanced economy over several decades, so too has Rwanda managed to recover from its devastating 1994 genocide to become one of the world’s fastest-growing economies.
Rwanda’s streets are clean, corruption is lower than in most other African states, and the country has a growing tech industry that’s bringing investment to the continent. In 2018, Rwanda elected a parliament with the highest proportion of women in the world at over 60 per cent. New infrastructure projects are popping up all over the country. The poverty rate is falling. The list of accomplishments goes on.
Still, Rwanda remains poor. According to the World Bank, its per capita GDP (PPP) in 2019 was only USD $2 318. However, the country’s upward trajectory has led many to proclaim it as a model for other African states to follow. This would be a mistake.
Rwanda’s development plan revolves around three policies shaped by Singapore’s experience: improving the ease of doing business to attract investment, building infrastructure, and establishing an authoritarian government that maintains stability. It is this third pillar that is the model’s fatal flaw. Power in Rwanda rests with President Paul Kagame and his party, not with the parliament. Kagame won re-election with 99 per cent of the vote in 2017 after a constitutional change permitted him to seek a third term.
Presidential authoritarianism, despite bringing benefits to Rwanda in this case, should not be emulated as a strategy elsewhere in Africa for three reasons. First, authoritarianism of any sort carries with it the enormous risk of eventual revolt. Second, it is unclear whether Rwanda’s current structure will be able to survive past Kagame’s departure from office. Lastly, reliance on a ‘benevolent dictatorship’ to guide development in Africa risks giving power to the wrong people, permanently.
To begin, Rwanda is ranked 155th on the World Press Freedom Index, behind countries such as Russia, Venezuela, and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Kagame’s government justifies its crackdown on the press though genocide denial laws. Censorship of the press is necessary, the government says, in order to prevent the resurgence of genocide. However, these laws have been used to silence journalists and disqualify opposition politicians, which is far beyond their stated intent.
The censorship does not stop there. The Rwandan government’s attempt to silence its critics extends beyond its own borders. Reports indicate that Rwanda has, on several occasions, attempted to assassinate dissidents abroad, including the prominent critic Colonel Patrick Karegeya. Moreover, Human Rights Watch indicates that the government authorizes summary executions, torture, and enforced disappearances on a regular basis.
Many developing states look at Rwanda and other examples, such as Singapore or China, and conclude that centralized power is the key to development. Critics worry that Rwanda’s authoritarianism will not succeed in suppressing the strains of 1994 forever; rather, they fear that suppressing outlets for dissent will cause tensions to bubble up under the surface until they reach a boiling point. Of course this would risk undoing all the gains Rwanda has seen thus far. As Filip Reyntjens, a professor of African Law and Politics, told World Finance: “Authoritarian rule and the frustrations that go with it risk destroying the socioeconomic gains achieved after the 1994 genocide.”
Additionally, there are doubts that Rwanda’s current system can survive without Paul Kagame’s watchful eye. According to Nic Cheeseman, Professor of Democracy at the University of Birmingham, Rwanda relies on Paul Kagame’s force of personality to keep tight control over patronage networks and keep corruption in check. This correlation poses two problems: first, it requires a level of political centralization that is difficult for other African states to replicate; and second, there is uncertainty over whether Kagame’s successor will act with such civic-mindedness. Rwanda, and countries similar to it, should not bet their futures on the individual benevolence of authoritarian leaders.
Moreover, much of Rwanda’s development success relies on the network of international connections that Kagame has personally established. Leaders like Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, and Ban Ki-moon sing his praises, while benefactors such as Bill Gates offer their financial support. Kagame has friends in academia, business, and international institutions which can lend support to his projects—the question of whether a successor could inherit this network is uncertain.
Kagame himself has admitted this. He said in 2012 that if he had not been able to find a successor by 2017, it would be because he had been unable to create the “capacity for a post-me Rwanda.” At present, he had made promises to step down in 2024, but still has yet to name a successor.
Aside from the reliance on Kagame’s personal influence, other African states should avoid Rwanda’s development model because it relies on the unstable foundation of a “benevolent dictatorship.” For every Paul Kagame or Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew that manages to bring development and stability to their nations, there are many others who exploit their position for personal benefit—even if they pose as benign to start. History is rife with examples of other authoritarian leaders who promised their countries modernization and development, only to see such progress undone when their citizens revolted against their regime’s oppressive rule. Iran’s Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, or Libya’s Muammar Gaddafi are but a few notable examples.
Democracy provides a way to jettison unpopular leaders from office when they inevitably make poor decisions. This function is not possible in a dictatorship, even in a ‘benign’ one like Paul Kagame’s. Building democracy in Africa may be easier in a conceptual sense, but several states have already achieved it. Ghana and Botswana, for instance, are both functioning—albeit flawed—democracies that have managed to deliver high economic growth rates just like Rwanda. And, like Rwanda, Ghana has a plan of achievable, realistic development goals that it is steadily making progress towards. These are the development models other states should follow.
Rwanda’s progress since 1994 is undoubtedly impressive; however, the temptation for other states to emulate this success can be detrimental. They do not need to choose between democracy and development. As the Rwanda model shows, there are major flaws in choosing one over the other that can make things worse. Rwanda has been successful thus far because of the authoritarian leadership of Paul Kagame and the government’s reliance on his personality to affect change. However, Rwanda’s future remains uncertain, and other African states would be better off looking elsewhere for their own development models. While Ghana and Botswana provide real-world examples to follow, further study may be needed on how to emulate Rwanda’s economic growth without enabling the rule of authoritarian governments.
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