Reports over the past month of an impending meeting between U.S. President Donald Trump and the North Korean leader Kim Jong-Un shouldn’t obscure the major challenges ahead to resolving the crisis on the Korean peninsula.

It’s called a “charm offensive,” and it is the tactic that North Korea employed at the Pyeongchang Winter Games. This strategy came on the heels of various nuclear tests and missile launches from North Korea, which have been a key feature of the hermit kingdom’s military strategy.

North Korea’s charm offensive came fully equipped with athletes walking with their South Korean counterparts under a common flag, a unified Korean women’s hockey team, an appearance from Kim Jung Un’s sister, and even a North Korean cheerleading squad.

The juxtaposed rhetoric between claiming to “tame the mentally deranged U.S. dotard with fire” and bringing a cheerleading squad to South Korea raised many eyebrows towards Kim Jong Un’s overall strategy.

The Olympic Games proved an effective setting for diplomatic progress, as South Korea agreed to enter into formal negotiations with North Korea for the first time since 2015.  According to South Korean President Moon Jae-In, negotiations between the Koreans will attempt to bring peace to the Peninsula by reducing the chances of accidental conflict arising from miscalculation or a lack of communication.

Although it is clear why South Korea would be interested in pursuing negotiations, given the geo-political threat of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program understanding the latter’s objectives requires a more critical analysis.

One possibility is that North Korea is pursuing negotiations to improve its public image. Its willingness to participate signals a degree of rationality to the international community. The North is willing to negotiate peacefully rather than through threats of nuclear war. North Korea not only hopes that this strategy will elicit exoneration from states but will also improve its international reputation.

According to the U.S. State Department, another explanation for the shift in strategy is that Kim Jong-Un seeks to drive a wedge between South Korea and the United States. The alliance between South Korea and the U.S. was put into question recently given their divergent responses to North Korea’s invitation to negotiate. While South Korea welcomed the offer, Trump maintained a hardline approach against negotiations. Specifically, he required that North Korea be willing to discuss denuclearization before coming to the negotiating table. Because South Korea seemed to undercut the clout of Trump’s policy, it was believed that either the U.S. would have to change its stance or split from its ally.

But Trump did neither. While he called the talks between the Koreas a “good thing,” he nevertheless reiterated his demand that North Korea agree to nuclear disarmament before meeting with the U.S. and imposed the toughest economic sanctions yet on the reclusive country.

More recent developments point to another possible motivating factor for Un: curbing the U.S. military and economic threat.

Rather than entering into an anticipated stalemate with the U.S., North Korea has decided to meet the United States’ demands. According to South Korean officials, North Korea is willing to discuss abandoning its nuclear weapons program and suspending all nuclear tests while negotiations take place.

However, the likelihood of a negotiated settlement is low. It remains unclear whether Un’s actions are merely a show for the international community or a sincere step to reach an agreement.

He is likely looking to the experiences of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya and Saddam Hussein in Iraq to understand the risks of denuclearization for guarantees of U.S. security. In the case of Libya, the U.S. offered security in exchange for dismantling the country’s nuclear weapons program. However, as Gaddafi became disillusioned with the value of U.S. support, NATO intervened and facilitated the overthrow of his regime. In the case of Iraq, after having complied with denuclearization procedures, the U.S.’ mistrust of Hussein prevailed over the inspection reports that found no evidence of nuclear weapons in Iraq. The U.S. nevertheless allowed its feelings of mistrust to justify the decision to invade and overthrow the Iraqi leader.

In these two examples, negotiations with the U.S. only led to a weakening and ultimate overthrow of the autocrat. It is unlikely that North Korea is looking to follow in the footsteps of these two dictators.

The situation is further complicated by the state of the Iran nuclear deal. Trump believes that the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), which removes sanctions from Iran in exchange for denuclearizing, is a faulty agreement. Trump claims that the agreement would be more effective if it became permanent in its implementation and wider in its scope. Such a position on the JCPOA will likely inform the conditions under which the U.S. would enter into an agreement with North Korea, where denuclearization must be wide in scope and permanent in nature. Of course, both features are unlikely to be favorable in the eyes of Un.

It is therefore too soon to rejoice about the impending first meeting between a U.S. President and a North Korean head of state. Un’s charm and Trump’s willingness to negotiate will likely come with a catch.