“Cautious Optimism” for Indonesian Chinese

As the “year of elections” enters its second month, global attention has shifted towards Indonesia as the world’s third largest democracy went to the polls on February 14. While the actual results would not be known for several weeks, polling samples have predicted a victory for current Minister of Defense Prabowo Subianto and his running mate Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who also happens to be the son of current President Joko Widodo. Accordingly, Prabowo has claimed the presidential race win and various governments such as Singapore, Malaysia, Australia, Thailand, and the Czech Republic have since extended their congratulations towards Prabowo. Prabowo’s competitors have yet to concede, but a second round of elections, which would occur if no one wins a majority in the first round, is generally considered unlikely.

For Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese population, there are reasons to be both optimistic and anxious about this election. All three candidates for Indonesia’s presidential race issued Lunar New Year blessings as the election date overlapped with Lunar New Year festivities, and they largely refrained from the identity politics that were commonplace in previous elections. In cities like Surakarta, these celebrations are highly public affairs open to all races and residents express their wishes for communal peace, marking the commendable progress made in fostering social harmony. Such a scene would be almost unthinkable decades prior, when President Suharto’s New Order regime imposed harsh assimilationist policies on Indonesian Chinese, who also suffered widespread violence during the May 1998 riots that forced Suharto out of power. At the same time, political participation among the Chinese community is rising, with about 40 candidates running for legislative seats this election. They represent a variety of parties and views, reflecting a great deal of political diversity within the community and challenging stereotypes of Chinese as money-minded. As Indonesian politics analyst Dr. Leo Suryadinata observed, playing identity politics at this juncture is too dangerous and counterproductive to consider, given its tendency to cause political instability.

This did not mean, however, that the Indonesian Chinese harbour no reservations about their position in the country. Even as they celebrated Lunar New Year, the fact that it overlapped with elections this year was a source of anxiety, especially for older generations who had personally witnessed and experienced the discrimination and violence of the past. One elderly interviewee remarked that the election made them wary of interference from “certain forces or sinister actors”, since an unfair result might lead to unrest and by extension implicate them. Another interviewee said that while they might view the election positively, they would still stay home during tense times, like when the election results are announced. This is unsurprising, considering that ethnic and racial issues had played a significant role in Indonesian politics. In 2017, religious backlash against Jakarta’s Chinese governor resulted in a blasphemy trial and conviction along with the loss of his governorship, while the 2019 elections featured a similar use of identity politics to stoke nationalist sentiments at the expense of minorities. Even up until last year, stereotypes about the Indonesian Chinese have been exploited to make a political point. These include claiming that the Chinese overwhelmingly dominate the Indonesian economy while the pribumi (natives) are relegated to second place, and implying that the government is beholden to the Chinese and anti-Islam. The legacies of Indonesian identity politics continue to weigh heavily on Indonesian society.

Then there is the matter of Prabowo himself. Despite his attempt to rebrand as a cute and loveable grandfather figure this election, he had engaged in divisive rhetoric in previous campaigns. In particular, Prabowo’s military past has also come under scrutiny. He was accused of instigating the anti-Chinese riots during 1998, as well as being responsible for a series of other human rights violations including the kidnapping of democracy activists and massacres in East Timor. Given his poor human rights record, commentators have expressed concerns over the future of Indonesia’s democracy, with a New York Times article worrying that Indonesia’s preponderance of young voters has led to a lack of concern over Prabowo’s brutality, human rights and civil liberties. To these commentators, Prabowo’s victory means, at the very least, the continuing erosion of the rule of law that had begun under President Jokowi and at worst a return to authoritarian strongman rule, reminiscent of Suharto and his New Order. What is less mentioned are the potential effects on Indonesian Chinese. The New Order enabled and perpetrated the government’s horrific abuses on the Chinese, treating them as second-class citizens in their own country, but democratisation paved the way for them to finally have a say in national politics and work towards a more inclusive society. While it remains to be seen whether Prabowo has truly reformed himself, democratic backsliding in Indonesia is likely to also occur at Chinese expense.