How the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict became 2020’s forgotten war

For six weeks in October and early November, the Caucasus states of Armenia and Azerbaijan fought a bloody war for control over the disputed territory of Nagorno-Karabakh. The collapse of a fragile ceasefire line on September 27 quickly led to the indiscriminate use of rockets, drones, and artillery fire, as well as brutal trench warfare in a conflict that killed an estimated 5 000 people. The fighting came to an end on November 9 when Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a Russian-brokered settlement that was widely seen as a victory for Azerbaijan. 

The origins of the war date back to a territorial dispute in the Caucasus region that was reopened after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. During the decades when both states were members of the Soviet Union, the predominantly ethnic Armenian region of Nagorno-Karabakh was incorporated into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic. After the two states gained their independence, the Armenian population of Nagorno-Karabakh sought to rejoin Armenia, leading to a vicious war that killed some 30 000 people. A ceasefire was arranged in 1994 by Russia, France, and the United States—the co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)’s Minsk Group—which maintained that Nagorno-Karabakh would remain a part of Azerbaijan. However, it was effectively controlled by an ethnic Armenian separatist regional government. Tensions along the ceasefire line occasionally led to violent clashes, most notably in 2016, but the recent conflict marked an absolute breakdown of the fragile truce. 

The end of the 2020 conflict is undoubtedly welcome news for the international community. The war raised serious humanitarian concerns, including a mounting civilian death toll and allegations of war crimes. It also risked inflaming regional tensions, as neighbours like Turkey and Russia fueled the conflict with arms, equipment, and foreign fighters.  

However, the recent peace agreement should also give the non-regional members of the Minsk Group cause for serious self-reflection. During the six weeks of fighting, the international community largely proved itself incapable or indifferent―a failure which ultimately led Russia to intervene unilaterally. The resulting peace deal provides short-term relief, but leaves many of the underlying tensions unresolved. 

The clearest, and perhaps the most understandable, challenge the international community faced during this time was the COVID-19 pandemic. Experts claim the pandemic both limited traditional diplomatic channels via travel restrictions and generally “distracted” major powers as they focused their resources and efforts on the domestic challenge of fighting the virus. In the words of one Caucasus specialist for the International Crisis Group, the pandemic was, in a perverse sense, “the perfect time” for the belligerents in Nagorno-Karabakh to start a war. 

The limited ability of the Minsk Group members to impose a solution from afar became clear in October, after three ceasefires—brokered by Russia, France, and the United States respectively—all broke down in a matter of hours. However, France and the United States were slow to explore viable alternatives. On October 30, U.S. National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien called for the deployment of Scandinavian peacekeepers to the region, but with the United States fixated on the presidential election, O’Brien’s efforts were largely ignored by the domestic media and the administration alike. 

As a result, the Russian-orchestrated settlement remains the best hope for peace in the short-term. However, it leaves key issues unresolved and introduces new potential for friction in the region. Russia has already begun the deployment of nearly 2 000 troops to Nagorno-Karabakh to act as peacekeepers along the new ceasefire line. But Russia’s status as a neutral arbiter is disputed given its deep historical involvement in the region, including an ongoing mutual defence pact with Armenia. Analysts have expressed concerns about how Azerbaijan might react to the Russian presence in the long term, noting that in time “this peacekeeping operation may start to look like an occupying force.” Armenians may be equally incensed to hear that their longtime adversary Turkey will assume a role in the peacekeeping process, though the Kremlin maintains that only Russian troops will be deployed in Nagorno-Karabakh. 

The current ceasefire agreement also does little to lay the groundwork for a lasting peace. The new ceasefire lines drawn in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding regions are largely based on the military situation in the final days of the war, rather than in accordance with principles of self-determination for the inhabitants of the area. The Minsk Group has long maintained that a lasting solution must be based around respect for three principles: the non-use of force, the territorial integrity of states, and the right to self-determination of peoples. Until the parties commit to these principles, the conflict over the area cannot be resolved—it can only be frozen. 

An effective international response to the conflict would have required active and sustained leadership efforts by states outside the region (most notably France and the United States), and an openness to creative diplomatic solutions capable of overcoming the challenges of the pandemic—both of which are in short supply in 2020. But with the end of the fighting comes an opportunity for the Minsk Group to redeem itself: the member states must redouble their efforts at the bargaining table to help transform the makeshift Russian ceasefire into a just and lasting peace.